THE COLD WAR- A TIMELY HISTORY
The Cold War: A New History- John Lewis Gaddis

The 'dean of American cold war historians', John Gaddis, opens the second chapter of his book with a surreal scenario. Even history buffs like me disbelievingly read the first few lines with consternation, and then the fiction begins to sink in. It's 1950. In response to South Korean and American troops' buildup near the Korean demilitarized zone, the Soviets drop two atomic bombs on two South Korean cities. In response, General Douglas MacArthur takes matters in his own hands and orders the atomic bombing of two equivalent Soviet cities. Escalating the horror, the Chinese prepare to arm themselves with more atomic bombs and answer a blow with a blow...

Fortunately, we know that this did not happen. The Yale historian's point is that it could have, and it's all too easy for us, ensconced as we are in 2006, to look back on those days and underestimate the colours of a very different world from today's. Gaddis's superb and succint cold war history should (finally?) convince us why capitalism is not just about inivisble hands, profit making, and competition. With his lucid prose and authentic historical passages, Gaddis makes it clear that the cold war was not a fight between communism and capitalism, but surely one between democracy and totalitarianism. One of the big questions we ask today is if capitalism and true democracy necessarily go hand in hand. Although a black and white answer to this question is probably still not possible (especially with China always threatening to be a nice exception to the rule), history makes it clear that they mostly have to. The reason is that only free expression and free actions can encourage competitions between every citizen of a country. In case of China, I get the feeling that the world should bide its time...
The cold war, then, was a competition between the wielders of power whose anchor was historical infallibility, and those who learnt from their fallibility.

The first part of Gaddis's book is an eloquent account of 1940s and 50s US-Soviet relations (that inevitably involved the rest of the world). Based on the latest declassified US, Soviet, and Chinese archives, Gaddis narrates the political aspirations, misunderstandings, and convictions of all the major players that defined the era. In doing so, he dispels many illusions that persisted for a long time in the minds of both historians and the lay public alike. These revelations serve as painful reminders of a time when decisions were taken based on ignorance, ignorance that has begat the world in its current state of affairs, and that will resonate in political and social undercurrents for a long time to come. For example, it is now almost a proven, known fact that Joseph Stalin had neither the conviction nor the resources to wage in any significant conflict with the US. In Europe as well as in Southeast Asia, the Tsar of the proletariat deftly played on the many misunderstandings about the Soviet Union and its policies that US officials harboured. Many times these misunderstanding bordered on paranoia about Soviet nuclear attacks. However, these also gave plenty of opportunities and excuses for the Soviets to build more nuclear weapons and advance the cause of Marxist-Leninist principles. Stalin could not have engaged in any conflict during the 1940s and 1950s, simply because his country had fought the most brutal and exhausting war in its history, leading to unbelievable losses of about 10 million lives, both civilian and military (US losses in comparison, numbered a 'mere' 300,000). Much of the Soviet industrial capacity had been destroyed, compared to the then thriving US economy. The morale of the people was still recovering from its nadir, and at such a time, even an iron-handed tyrant like the Soviet premier could not have exercised his will according to whim. At the same time, Stalin was hardly one to shirk from exploiting any opportunity for expanding the sphere of his noble communist principles. Everytime, the shrewd dictator offered the US the bait of imminent communist takeover. Everytime they took it. Of course, there was some justification for the US in doing this, given its fear of communism. What Stalin understood was that he could use satellite communist states for creating a false facade of the so-called 'domino effect'- the belief that once one state is overrun by communists, every state nearby will continue to do so, until an entire continent becomes submerged under the Kremlin's boot. This was not really true. As Gaddis propounds, Stalin found the opportunity to use the aspiring communists Mao Zedong (China), Kim Jong (North Korea), and the tenacious Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam) to further his communist interests. Even if their particular communist interests were not simply in being cronies of Stalin, still they were worshippers of the leader of the greatest communist country in the world, and Stalin knew better than not to use their influence to at least project a threat of world communist domination. However, the US kept on misunderstanding motives of these leaders that led to increasing and uncalled for American presence in Korea, Africa, and finally the debacle in Vietnam.

The concept of threat leads naturally to that of non-alignment. Any able military leader knows that psychology plays a pivotal role in influencing the 'enemy's' choices and actions. Stalin understood this better than anyone else at the time, and was a master geopolitical thinker. It is not conflict but the threat of perceived conflict that sculpts international relations. Whereas the US fell for the threat of communist domination, the Soviets fell for that of acute nuclear retaliation. They also used this threat to develop more nuclear weapons of their own. Both powers were kept in check by MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction- wonderfully epitomized in Kubrick's outrageous and all too realistic Dr. Strangelove). After Stalin however, the US seems to have understood this concept only too well, and they implemented it in the form of the well known detente and containment principles which they applied to US-Soviet relations. As for non-alignment, Gaddis lucidly explains how every state from Yugoslavia (Tito) to Taiwan (Chiang Kai Sheikh) to Egypt (Gamal Abdel Nasser) to India (Nehru) exploited and even abused this preorogative to project a different kind of threat; the threat of succumbing to occupation or influence by the other side. I chuckled when I read how this principle enabled these small nations to force the great powers to do a balancing act. It was really simple. What these small states were saying was, if you don't strengthen our economy/give us military aid/quell our political unrest, we may defect to the other side, or at the least, we may get embroiled in civil war which will lead to the other side occupying us anyway. Compelling examples, as Gaddis notes, of "tails wagging the dogs"!

Is is also heartening to see that in many ways, democracy does seem essential to capitalism, at least the 'American kind' of capitalism that we are accustomed to. Give people more choices, allow dissent and constant improvement in the polity, and then only can competition lead to a thriving free market with maximum incentives. It is one of the greatest ironies of history that the very people that communism aspired to free and empower were its greatest and most brutally oppressed victims. The mother seems to have found it necessary to murder her own children to apparently 'empower' them. In the list of genocidal dictators, Marshall Stalin definitely tops the list, surpassing even Adolf Hitler in purging the state of the maximum number of its own citizens and dissidents. Stalin's angel of death was the infamous sadist and rapist Lavrenti Beria, a brilliant operative nonetheless, under whose supervision, something like 10 million 'dissidents' were murdered in the Soviet Union (As much of a monster as he was, credit must be given to Beria for being the administrative architect of the Soviet bomb. See Rhodes). This single fact should convince anyone of the sheer maniacal idiocy of the kind of communism that prevailed during the time. However, it seems that communist leaders have always been in an informal competition with each other to top each other's deeds in mass murder. Where Stalin executed millions in his gulags, his somewhat unwilling protege Chairman Mao gladly implemented an 'experiment' that led to the single greatest humanitarian tragedy of the century; the starvation to death of almost 30 million citizens as a result of Mao's warped execution of collectivized agriculture. I believe that this is the most compelling case against communism; that in every instance, its practioners have had to resort to outright violence and mass murder of citizens in order to 'empower' them. What better demonstration of a failed philosophy than one that needs to actually and paradoxically contradict itself in order to secure itself. Reductio ad absurdum. The very fact that a wall had to be put up in Berlin indicates the inherent dissatisfaction with communism that abounded in people's minds. Unfortunately, the world failed to stop the gory debacle, at least not before the literal factory-like butchering of millions.

There is much in Gaddis's book that is revealing, and I can touch on only a few tidbits here. The revelations stride across well-established notions about well-known events. The Cuban missile crisis for example; contrary to universal belief that the attempt was part of a direct threat to the US by the Russians, Gaddis recounts how it was first and foremost, an attempt by the Russians to provide support for Castro's government, a government in which they first did not believe in, but which they later ecstatically supported with the hope that Castro would set an example and bring communism to Latin America. It is also instructive to note again, how the US and the Soviet Union got embroiled in Castro's grievances in Angola and Ethiopia where they had no business in the first place, and whose sovereignties did not even interest them too much (and apparently don't ever since then). It was not a case of eating the cake, but simply being too terrified of letting the other person eat it. This pattern of preventive (preemptive?) conflict continued into the 70s, in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Nuclear weapons continued to be an ugly motive and part of decision making during the cold war. Even today, we lament how, in the face of these apparent Soviet threats, the US constructed a nuclear arsenal of absurd proportions; meaninglessly more than what it would need to effect deterrence. Some credit must be given to people like George Kennan (containment) and Kissinger (detente) who saw political diplomacy as being more effective than shows of military might. In retrospect, one can only note with irony, that in spite of the US lead in nuclear weaponry and all the hullabaloo about being first in the arms race, it was the USSR which made the first H-bomb that could be delivered by air, and also developed the first ICBM capable of carrying a nuclear warhead in 1958, events which massively upped the ante. This made treaties outlawing some or the other aspect of nuclear weapons only partially successful, since because of asymmetry in weapons arsenals or delivery systems, no treaty could bring complete security to either side. And yet the efforts of scientists and politicians who strove to implement these treaties, no matter that they were born out of rightly inculcated fear of nuclear war, should be applauded.

Gaddis also devotes a section to how Americans kept on reinforcing their faith in the rule of law even when their leaders sought it fit to trangress constitutional principles abroad in the name of 'national security'. After all, every president upto and including George W. has been doing it. But the history of cold war America still provides hope that ordinary people's convictions for the overarching importance of constitutional principles over law will finally prevail. Gaddis narrates how Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, all undertook to give explicit or tacit approval for all kinds of covert actions, especially by the CIA. As is known now, this involved everything from government coups to surveillance to assasination attempts. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an embarrassing attempt at toppling Castro's government. In the beginning, people actually supported presidential decisions like these. The apologetic phrase was 'plausible denial', a phrase that I am sure makes the rounds of the administration everyday now. But gradually, and especially when Johnson authorized large-scale Vietnam bombings that escalated the war, people began to take notice and protest. Gaddis notes how Nixon carried the principle to the extreme, when he began to engage in covert action against his own people. That was too much to take for the egalitarian Americans, and Watergate is now history. It is heartening to read this part of American history, where people constantly reminded even the most powerful man in the world, that he is not above the rule of law, that subversive and damaging actions even in foreign lands cannot be justified in the name of national security. Where are those people now?

Interestingly, it is precisely these passages of Gaddis's book that lead me to question his apparent neutrality as a historian in some instances, when he finally comes to the Reagan administration. Gaddis praises this period as the period when common men turned the tables on authoritarian regimes. Gaddis calls these men as unusually proficient- not surprisingly- actors...Gaddis's list of leading men (and the sole woman) includes Margaret Thatcher, Pope John Paul II, Ronald Reagan, and a host of popular rising leaders from Eastern Europe, whose views were first suppressed, then mildly neglected, and then grudgingly approved by the Kremlin. The reasons for the Kremlin's astonishing transition is mainly, according to Gaddis, the result of a single man's conviction and efforts- Mikhail Gorbachev. Gaddis thinks Gorbachev was the single greatest deserving recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. He cites his constant struggles with the Reagan administration, he cites Reagan's cocktail party humour that served to mitigate tensions more than once, and he cites the contribution of all his other actors noted above, all of whom began as common men and women. It's of course encouraging to see that it was the common man who brought about the eventual downfall of Stalin's once brutal regime. The regime had since been gradually but surely made more tolerant by every successive Soviet leader, either because of genuine concern, or mostly because of accomdations with the West that became necessary for diplomatic and economic purposes. But it was Gorbachev who finally drove the nail into the coffin, or at least handed over the nails to his successor Boris Yeltsin. It seems that many times, he did this simply through inaction. In 1989, the Chinese were the sole officials to use brutal force to suppress the Tiananmen square protests. No such thing on a comparable scale happened during that decade in Eastern Europe, although opportunities were plenty. Everywhere, people were destroying once venerated symbols, breaking down barriers, and cutting through barbed wires. For the Soviet Union, it had become both infeasible and too costly, to keep on maintaining its sphere of influence. Reagan and Bush took full advantage of this. In witty, idealistic, even religious speeches, Reagan denounced the 'evil empire'. But what about Reagan's own evil actions in Latin America, where he was following the tradition of his predecessors to suppress left-wing uprisings and install right-wing governments, no matter how oppressive? What about the Iran contra deal? I was struck by the fact that Gaddis does not devote much space to these discussions. And then it struck me that maybe I was expecting too much from the man, when I found out that he is an active supporter of George W. Bush's war in Iraq. Since history has repeated itself, there is no reason, I suppose, for Gaddis to change his views.

The most striking insight to come out of Gaddis's book was the reasons he explores for assesing capitalism's success. Granted that democracy was more successful than domination. But after all, everybody since Marx had believed that capitalism would end up causing conflicts between capitalists, and that collapse and revolution would have to take place sooner or later because of inequality between the rulers and the ruled. And we do have to admit that the twentieth century was much more of a century of totalitarian regimes. What happened then?
What no communist visionary had banked on was the self-correcting, progressive nature of modern capitalism. The real difference between the two systems is that of dogma versus flexibility, what Gaddis calls 'spontaneity'. As a scientist, I appreciate this eternal skepticism and lack of deference to authority. Communist nations have justified their actions and dreams mainly on the basis of anecdotal evidence from history and historical infallibility. Capitalist nations have always learnt from their mistakes and have never tried to assume systems as being foolproof. They have made concessions to workers, the poor and the oppressed, and have strived to raise living standards for the unfortunate. When capitalism realised the macabre circumstances which impossible war reparations enforced upon Germany in the aftermath of the first world war- an experiment that finally went horribly wrong- it learnt from its mistake and implemented the Marshall Plan for the restoration of Europe. Capitalism, in this guise, is hardly the capitalism Marx, Lenin, or Stalin imagined and opposed. In fact, we get the feeling that Karl Marx would have been profoundly disappointed with the communism of Lenin and Stalin. The very fluidity of capitalism ensures its constant self-appraisal and development. And that again reinforces the connection between capitalism and democracy that has been noted. Without freedom of expression and the power to make choices, without agreeing to disagree with each other, how can there be progress? Finally, it simply does not seem that communism is compatible with human nature. How can someone ever have the incentive to progress if the state is confiscating part of their wealth everytime they earn it, in the name of bringing about 'equality'? Growth needs incentives, and those incentives lie in unlimited possibilities, not unyielding consequences. Modern day capitalism may not have great equality to begin with. But it does have equal opportunities; equality exists at least as a realistic goal. Freedom only cements this edifice.
Gaddis says that even as late as 1950, writers were questioning the apt definition of democracy; is it freedom without equality, or equality without freedom? In the communist bloc, it seemed that leaders were prepared to sacrifice freedom for the proverbial equality that their philosophical fathers advocated. But in reality, not even equality remained in the end. No freedom, and still no equality. Only the shrads of textbooks and manifestos that propounded lofty principles. A grotesquely failed enterprise indeed.

Gaddis says in his preface that many American students today have scant knowledge of, and interest in, the struggles that underpinned the existence of two superpowers for almost fifty years. Gaddis rightly says that instruction in this history is important, because it illustrates how flimsy even assured perspectives and predictions can be. I believe it is important for another reason. Twentieth century history has shown that democracy with all its merits, is neither infallible nor inherently strong and influential. Why else would the century have been dominated by Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot? The self-appraisal of capitalist states that Gaddis expounds on is probably not just a key feature, but an essential one. Democracy seems to be like a tightrope walker. You have to keep balancing, keep asking, keep doubting and progressing, simply to stay in the act. Excelling takes even more efforts. Bad democracies are as prone to totalitarian takeovers as completely devastated nations. Progress does not ensure stability. No matter what percentage of the population is educated, no matter how modern thinking is, no matter how generously wealth is distributed, war and collapse can be surprisingly close for any nation (look at Germany in the twentieth century). Democracy in principle faces the same danger of succumbing to a notion of historical infallibility that communism did. And the more democracy succeeds, the more this danger actually becomes realistic. The message of self-improvement and 'spontaneity' is the one that seems be the most enduring in Gaddis's book. In current circumstances, I believe it has become even more timely, because we longer live in a world that is divided more or less unambiguously between 'bad' communists and 'good' capitalists. The demons we fight today seem to be the ones from within. These would be the toughest to identify in the first place, which is all the more reason to keep the message in mind. History should help us to do that.